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1. Introd uction 
A1I linguistic expressions are subjective in that they are uttel・edby 
the speaker， and it is difficult to make a wh01ly objective utterance. 
One form of an objective utteranc巴 isto report what the speaker has 
heard from someone. For instance， ifthe speaker has heard Mr. For-
ster say，“1 n巴glectmy children，" the speaker is likely to report the 
situation using a reporting verb: Mr. Forster says that he neglects his chil-
dren (Quirk et a1. 1985: 613). The role of the speaker is just to r巴port
what he or she has heard from someone. What the speaker wants to 
convey in this type of sentence is the content of the message; here， on 
the content level， the speak目、 judgmentor interpretation is not in-
volved. On the other hand， the same sentence Mr. Forster neglects his 
children is likely to convey the speaker's judgment based on the in 
formation gathered by the speaker. The utterance is now subjective， as 
what the speaker conveys is not the objective content of the message， 
but the speaker's judgment目
In papers 1 published previously (Kitabayashi 2002 and 2006)， 1 ex-
amined some of the syntactic and semantic traits of utterance on the 
content and judgm巴ntlevels. One of the characteristics of judgment 
sentences is that a judgment is made on the basis of some facts. In the 
following sentence， th巴 speaker'sjudgment that“you should study a1l 
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night" is made on th巴basisof the fact that "you have exams tomorrow'¥ 
(1) You should study al night， ifyou have exams tomorrow. 
However， there is an exceptional case. Sentence (2) is deviant from the 
norm in that the judgm巴ntthat there is a whiskey bot1e behind the 
books is based on the information which cannot be verified in an objec-
tive way， since the only way t旬ov巴引ri江fyt出hespeake町r、memory is tωo che目ck王
wh εeth 巴臼rthe whisk 巴y bottle is behind the books nor not (化cf.Pelyvas 
1996: 76-77). 
(2) If 1 remember correctly， there is a whiskey bottle behind the 
books. 
Note that the above sentence assumes some kind of stylistic effect. The 
-ifc1ause modifies the probability of the speaker's proposition， and this 
makes th巴 int巴rpersonalcommunication smooth in case there is not a 
whiskey bot1e behind the books after all. 
In this paper 1 wi1 examine these two types of utterance on the con-
tent and judgment level， and th巴 deviantforms from the norm. 1 also 
proceed to investigate what stylistic effects are produced by the devia-
tion from the norm， and 1 also intend to claim that such stylistic phe-
nomena should be analyzed on the level of real communication in which 
both the speaker and interlocutor are involved. 
2. Two types of utterance 
In the Introduction， we examined two types of utt巴rance. The dis-
tinction is related to the authority of the utterance (Quirk et al. 1985: 
615). If the speaker obtains certain information from someone and re-
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ports it to the interlocutor， the speaker may want to make it explicit 
who has the authority of the information. The speake1' presents the in-
formation that has been obtained in an objective way， without giving his 
or he1' judgment. Put another way， employing a reporting expression 
such as Mr. Forster says that he neglects his child1'en， the speaker does 
not “accept responsibility fo1' the p1'opositional content of the utterance" 
(Maat and Sande1's 2000: 65). 
Now let us examine the inte1'pretation of Mr. Forste1' neglects his chil 
dren as a judgment sentence. Suppose th巴speakerhas gathered pieces 
of information about Mr. Forster's activities and reputation， and made a 
judgment about M1'. Forster. In this case， Mr. Forste1' 11eglects his chil 
dl'en can be regarded as a judgm巴ntsentence. The speake1' functions 
not only as the speaker of the utteranc巴， but as the pel・sonwho makes a 
judgment about the content of the utteranc巴. If w巴representthis situa-
tion schematically， itwill be something like this: 
CAUSE EFFECT 
山 SON日 川一DES
Diagram 1 
The above schema of cause and effect can be amplified as:“From things 
I have hea1'd and seen， I c1aim it to be a fair and true assessment that 
Mr Fo1'st巴rneglects his childr巴n"(Quirk et a1. 1985: 614). To show 
that the p1'opositional content is the speaker's judgment， th巴 speakel・is
likely to use auxiliaries such as may and might 01' adverbs such as trob-
ably， but a simple form such as M1'. F01'stel' neglects his children can also 
be used as a judgment sentenc巴 Thepoint here is that in a judgment 
sentence the speakel・ isinvolved in the interpretation of the sentence. 
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As the diagl百 nshows， the observation acts on the speaker， who conse-
quent1y concludes some proposition as a judgment. In this s巴nse，the 
speaker as the person who makes a judgment accepts responsibility for 
the content of the utterance. The authority of the utterance is in the 
speak巴I¥
What will happen then if the speaker obtains a sufficient amount of 
information as a basis of judgment? The speaker will be convinced of 
the propositional content and may use auxiliaries such as must. If the 
speaker assumes that the propositional content is obj巴ctive，he 01' she 
may use a simple expression such as M1'. Forste1' l1eglects his child1'en、
Thus， itcan b巴interpr巴tedon the content level if the speaker has suffi-
cient evidence of Mr. Forster's negligence of his children. In English， 
the expression on the content level can be identical with the one on the 
judgment 1巴vel. The sent巴nceM1'. Forster neglects his children as an 
objective sentence asserts the fact that Mr. Forster neglects his children 
without reserve. Thus it shows the public viewpoint of the situation， 
not the speak巴r'spersonal viewpoint. The fact that Mr. Forster neg田
lects his children is considered common knowledge; therefore， the pre-
sence of the speaker is not implied， which means the speaker does not 
have to assume the responsibility for the statement. After al， the 
knowledge common to anyon巴 inthe same way is understood as obj巴c-
tiv巴， thus reducing the amount of responsibility that the speaker must 
assume. 
What is now clear is that there are two types of utterance in lan-
guage. On巴isthe objective utterance on the content level and th巴other
is the speaker's judgmental utterance on the judgment level. The judg-
ment can be understood in a cause-effect schema in which some observa-
tion affects the speaker in the cause component， and then the speaker 
makes a judgment in the effect component. In addition， sufficient pieces 
of information in the cause component raise the level of evidentiality， 
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which turns a judgment sentence into an obj巴ctiveexpression. 
3. Two types of utterance and sentences with conjunctions 
In the pr巴vioussection， we examined two types of utterance. The 
sam巴wayof analysis can hold for the analysis of conjunctions. Sweet-
S巴1・(1990:76-87) proves that the use of conjunctions in English can be 
understood in the same way two types of utterance are analyzed within 
the discourse. 
3.1. The content level 
On the content level， the two events， cause and巴ffect，should be in-
terpreted in the world of real happenings. The role of the speaker is to 
report the situation objectively. The following sentence illustrates this 
situation. 
(3) Anna dropped her book because Victor bumped into her. 
The conjunction because in sentence (3) conn巴ctsthe two ev巴ntsthat 
happened in the real world. Victor's bumping into Anne (the cause 
component) acts on her， and cons巴quentlyshe dropped her book (the 
effect component). In this example， the speaker is not involved in the 
interpr巴tationof the utterance， as the speaker's role is just to utter the 
sentence. 
In (3)， the reason why Anna dropped her book is asserted. The 
speaker wants to convey the reason why Anna dropped her book. 
Sentence (3) normally presupposes that Anna dropped her book and 
asserts that this is caused by Victor's bumping into her (cf. Sweets巴1・
1990: 82-83). 
Another possibility of the because-clause on the content level is the 
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use of a comma before the subordinate clause， which is illustrated be-
low. In this casε， we are forced to read the sent巴ncein a diffel官 ltway. 
(4) Anna dropped her book， because Victor bumped into her. 
In the normal r巴ading，both of the events， 1)Anna dropped her book， 
and 2) the reason why she dropped her book was Victor's bumping into 
her， are asserted. In Givon's terms， both of the contents in the main 
and subordinat巴clausescan be challenged by the interlocutor (cf. Ver-
straete 2007: 150-151). In a commaless combined s巴ntencelike (3)， what 
is at issue is whether Victor bumped into Anna 01' not， not wheth巴1・
Anna dropped he1' book or not. Only the content of the subordinate 
clause can be challenged by the interlocutor. On the other hand， in the 
combined sentence with a comma， the contents both in the main and sub-
ordinate clauses are open to b巴challengedby the interlocutor. 
Let me proceed to discuss the combination of the two clauses with 
another example. Chronological order is sometimes represented by us 
ing the conjunction when. On the content 1巴vel，the speaker gives a 
chronological order of the two events with the conjunction when. 
(5) 1 was doing the dishes when he came in. 
The most common reading is that the speaker was washing the dishes 
and during that event he came in. The foreground information is ex 
pressed in th巴 mainclausεand the subordinate clause is backgrounded 
relativ巴tothe main clause， providing a temporal reference point for the 
event described in the main clause. In the underlined sentence， the 
main clause should be understood as the foreground information. 
(6) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is an international treaty 
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designed to promote nuc1ear disarmament. Under the Treaty， five 
countries are regarded as nuc1ear-weapon states. Those countries 
are the U. S.， Britain， Russia， China and France. A11 of them had 
nuc1ear weapons when the Treaty became ef巴ctivein 1970. The 
treaty prohibits these countries' proliferation of nuc1ear weapons. 
It also prohibits other member states from producing or posses-
sing them. (http://www.巴ow.alc.co.jp) 
Thus， the sentences fo11owing the underlined temporal sentence are re 
lated to the content of the main c1ause of the underlined part. 
What is common in the c1ause combinations with th巴 content-
conjunctions is that the information presented by the subordinate c1ause 
should add som巴thingnew to the discourse. In the case of the because-
c1ause the reason is added to the main c1ause and in the case of the 
when-c1ause the time reference is add巴dto the discourse. 
3.2. The judgment level 
This section considers claus巴 combinationsin which the speaker's 
judgm巴ntis involved. When two clauses are juxtaposed as in (7)， one 
reading is that the cause-effect relationship is latent巴venif there is no 
specific signal to show a causal relationship. Therefore， the fo11owing 
sentence can be read as meaning the speaker's judgm巴nt(“he must have 
turned over a new leaf") on the basis of the fact presented in the first 
sentence (“My son doesn't talk back these days"). 
(7) My son doesn't talk back these days; he must have turned over a 
new leaf. 
Note that th巴 basisof the judgment is a statement considered to be a 
fact rather than a statement as a judgment. This is a natural consequ-
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ence， considering that a judgment should be made on the basis of facts. 
The schema of cause-effect holds true when the conjunction because 
is巴mploy巴dsp巴cificallyto show a causal relationship between the two 
clauses. The following example does not mean that the light causes 
Dawson to stay at home. Rather， itis normally understood as meaning 
that the speaker's knowledge of th巴 light'sbeing on， as a pr官 nise，
causes the conclusion of Dawson's being at home. 
(8) Dawson must be at home， because the light is on. 
The analysis of the judgment sentence discussed in Section 2 can hold 
true for the clause combination on the judgment level. The only diffel・
ence is whether the basis of the judgment is ve1'balized巴xplicit1y01' not. 
Whereas the judgment reading of the sentence Ml'. F01'ste1' neglects his 
child1'en does not p1'ovide specific observations of the speaker as the 
basis of the judgment， the clause-combination with because on the judg-
ment level offe1's the basis of the judgment explicitly， i. e. the light is on. 
Diagram 2 represents this situation. 
CAUSE EFFECT 
民 TSON日 ?。???? ?????? ??
Diagram 2 
As another example of the judgment combination of two c1auses， we 
can give the c1ause combination with the conjunction if Look at the 
following sentence (Pelyvas 1996: 60). 
(9) You should study al night， ifyou hav巴巴xamstomorrow. 
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The speaker of this utterance assumes that the condition will be fulfil-
led. Thus the fact that there are exams tomorrow is a premise in this 
example. The ザーclause，therefore， does not express a real condition， 
but rather the reason why the speaker has reached a certain conclusion， 
i. e.“you should study al night". 
What is common to clause-combinations with conjunctions becαuse 
andザisthat the judgment of the speaker is made on the basis of the in-
formation as a fact which can be verified in an objective way. It is 
natural that judgments are based on facts， not on the speaker's opinions 
or f巴elings.
4. Deviation from the norm on the content level 
In this and the next sections， 1 will consider utter百 lcesof the clause 
combination d巴viantfrom the norm on the content and judgment levels. 
In this section we will re-examin巴somεofthe grammatical traits of the 
utterance on the content level and argue how the deviant forms on the 
content level play a special communicative function in the discourse. 
4.1. Deviation of chl'onological ol'del' on the content level 
Section 3.1 dealt with the chronologically-combined sentences with 
the conjunction when. In sentence (10)， the chronological order is rep-
resented and the subordinate claus巴 servesas a temporal reference 
point for the action described in the main clause. 
(10) 1 was doing the dishes when he came in. 
The above sent巴ncehas a second reading which can be paraphrased 
something like:“1 was doing the dishes， and rather in an unexpected 
way he came in". This construction is called “narrative-when-clause" 
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by Akatsuka and Tsubomoto (1998). Let me give some more examples. 
(11) a. He was about to shut the door， when John put his foot on the 
threshold. 
b. 1 was watching the t巴levision，when suddenly the lights went 
out. (Akatsuka and Tsubomoto 1998: 135) 
The narrative-tvhen-clause differs from an ordinary t己mporally-combined
clause in that the main clause serves as the setting of the event and the 
event presented in the subordinate clause appears as the foreground. 
Thus， the tvhen-clauses in (11) do not provide the temporal background 
for the main clause. On the contrary， itis the main clause event that 
functions as the background against which the event represented in the 
subordinate clause will build up. 
Let me consider further the nature of the foreground information 
represented in the subordinate clause. As we examined in Section 3， in 
an ordinary temporal tvhen-clause， the information in the main clause 
will be developed in the subsequent parts of the discourse. However， 
in the narrative-tvhen-clause， this is not the case. Not巴 howthe event 
in the narrative-tvhen-clause is developed in the following discourse. 
(12) Juanita was reading a story to Estela， when a knock sounded on 
the apartment door. 
heard of this late. 
Visitors at any time were rare， almost un-
(Akatsuka and Tsubomoto 1998: 139) 
The narrative-tvhen-clause is used in a contεxt in which events related 
with the one presented in the tvhen-clause are verbalized in the subse-
quent discourse. In the above discourse， a lmock on the door in the 
tvhen-clause will develop into the information about the visitor who 
knocked the door in the subsequent discourse. 
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In a norrnal reading of the when-clause， the grarnrnatical subject can 
control the action presented in the rnain clause. Thus， in1 was doing 
the dishesωhen he cαme in， the subject (“1") can control the action of 
doing the dishes. The speaker can stop doing the dishes because the 
action is under the control of the speaker. However， the reading of the 
narrative-when-clause represents the speaker's inability to control the 
action presented in th巴rnainclause. In other words， his entrance was 
so unexpect巴dto the speak巴rthat it was irnpossible for the speaker to 
stop doing the dishes. Rather， his entrance stopped the speaker frorn 
doing the dishes because the speaker was so surprised. By presenting 
the events in deviancy， i. e. th巴 backgroundinforrnation in the rnain 
clause and the foreground inforrnation in th巴 subordinateclause， the 
speaker intends to cornrnunicate a ternporal order of the events to the in-
terlocutor with a special stylistic effect: in this case， the speaker's unex-
pectedness. 
In the norrnal us巴ofthe when-claus巴， the subordinate clause restricts 
the action presented in the rnain clause目 Thesubordinate when-clause 
provides a refer巴ncepoint of the action described in the rnain clause. 
However， itis the event in the narrative-when-clause that is the fore-
ground， building up towards the action that really rnatt巴rsin the dis-
course， and the rnain clause s巴rvesas the background. It is the 
sp巴aker'sdiscretion to ernploy this special grarnrnatical construction. 
The speaker presents the rnainstrearn events in the position norrnally 
reserved for the background. 
If the subordinate clause originally reserved for the background is 
used to describe the event which will be pushed forward in the subse-
quent discourse， the interlocutor is forced to re-interpret the back-
ground inforrnation as the foreground. This is exactly what the 
speaker intends. The inforrnation norrnally interpreted as the fore 
ground inforrnation is now forced to be interpl・巴tedas the background 
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b巴causethe event described in the subordinate c1aus巴 issubsequent1y 
moved forward in the subsequent discourse. The narrative-ωhen-c1ause 
is a deviation from the norm in the sense that the normal foreground-
background relation is reversed; and the deviation is manipulated by 
the speaker to tel the interlocutor that he or she wants to show the in-
formation in an exceptional way and invites the interlocutor to shar巴
surprise and unexpectedness. 
4.2. Deviation of the becαuse-clause on the content level 
The following sentence was uttered by the former president of Sier-
ra Leone， who appeared on the TV documentary program， The St01)' of 
English. He sometimes dropped in at a market to buy some fish while 
he was president， and the fish merchant charged him high prices. The 
president accepted the situation and did not take it seriously， consider-
ing his social status as president. 
(13) Sometimes they charged high prices， b巴caus巴1was a pr巴sident.
As we saw in Section 3， the becαuse-c1ause with a comma can be inter-
preted as meaning that both the main and subordinate c1auses are 
asserted as information that can be challenged by the interlocutor. 
However， inthis case even though there is a comma befor巴 because，th巴
information that the speaker was a presid巴ntis known to the interlocu-
tor， because the speaker himself is th巴 formerpresident. Therefore， 
the information in the because-c1ause is not asserted even if there is a 
comma before the because-c1ause. In this sense， sentence (13) is deviant 
from the norm. 
Note that some kind of interpersonal function can be found here. 
The speaker， as a former president， pres巴ntsthe information that h巴
was a president known to th巴interlocutor，and by doing so， he tels the 
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interlocutor that it is no wonder that the merchants at the market over-
charged him and that he accepted their high prices with the feeling，“It's 
not a problem. It can't be helped because 1 am president". By emph-
asizing the fact that he was a president in the because-c1ause， the 
speaker intends to present the information in the main c1ause with a 
special stylistic effect. The former president understands what the fish 
merchant did to him and solicits the interlocutor to share the same feel 
ing as him. This sty!istic effect is cr巴atedby the deviation from the 
norm， inthis case， the deviation in t巴rmsof the informational stl・uctUl・E
of the c1auses. 
5. Deviation from the norm on the judgment level 
As we saw in the previous sections， the fundamental structure on 
the judgment level is that the speaker makes a judgment based on the 
facts he or she has gathered. The communicative function of a judg-
ment sentence resides in the transmission of the speaker's judgm巴ntin 
the main c1ause. Therefore， from th巴 informationalpoint of view， the 
speaker's judgment is placed in the foreground and the basis of the 
judgment in the background. The sentence discussed in the previous 
section is reproduced here. 
(14) Dawson must be at hom巴， because the light is on. 
The speaker wants to convey his judgment that Dawson is at home. 
The most likely context in which this sentence is uttered is that the 
speaker and interlocutor are discussing whether 01' not Dawson is at 
home. And the speaker of the sentence presents his opinion based on 
the fact that the light is on. We should not巴 twocharacteristics of a 
judgment sent巴nce. One is that the judgment part in the main c1ause is 
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the main part of the utterance. What the speaker wants to convey is 
his 01' her judgment. The other is that the basis of the judgment is an 
objective fact that can be verified. In this connection， two types of de-
viation are conceivable. One is the case in which the information in 
the subordinate clause is the for巴groundand can be pushed fOI・百九rardin 
the discourse， and the other is that the basis of the judgment is not a 
fact， but rather information which cannot be vel・ifiedin an objective 
manner. 
5.1. Deviation of the becαuse-clause on the judgment level 
The following discourse is a typical example illustrating the normal 
use of the because-claus巴 onthe judgment level we examined in Section 
3. 
(15)“1 didn't actually see the gun， but 1 heard this ‘bang， bang， bang.'" 
Christine Burgess， a 56-year-old accountant， told PA she had seen 
police carry a black zip-up bag to an ambulance outside the sta 
tion as she tried to get home on a bus. “1 was looking out of the 
window and saw them bring out the black zip-up bag and that 
must hav巴 beenth巴 personinvolved because nobody else was 
hurt. 1 saw it taken into the ambulance." 
(http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD / europe/ 
07/22/london.巴yewitness/index.html)
In normal usage， the judgment based on the facts presented in the main 
clause is push巴dforward in the subsequent discourse. In the above ex-
cerpt， the speak巴r'sjudgment (“that must have been the person invol-
ved") is developed in the following discourse， i. e.“1 saw it taken into 
the ambulance'¥The information in the main clause is the judgment of 
the speak巴r，which is made on the basis of the facts pl・巴S巴ntedin the 
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subordinate c1ause. 
However， in the following excerpt， the situation is in a sense re-
versed. Note the information in the main c1ause is pushed into the 
background and th巴informationpresented in the subordinate c1ause is 
put forward in the subsequent discourse. 
(16) 1 must have been tired， because 1 didn't wake up unti1 after half-
nine todayApart from making a few phone calls， and watching 
“Click"， 1 don't really know what 1 did during the day. During 
the evening， 1 spent a bit of time updating my blog. At about 
quarter-to-ten， Cherryboy called me to tel me that “Now That's 
What 1 Call Music" had just been released. 1 told him that a few 
weeks ago， my site had b巴巴nsecond for searches for“Now That's 
What 1 Call Music" on Google. He checked again， and found out 
that I'm stil on the second page. 
(http://www.robdickson.co. uk/blog/2008/03/16/ diary) 
The above excerpt illustrates th巴situationin which the speaker wants 
to place mOl‘e informational weight onto the subordinate sentence. The 
because-c1ause in the above excerpt demonstrates a somewhat deviant 
form from the norm in that the judgment presented in the main c1ause 
(“1 must hav巴beentired") is not pushed forward in the subsequent dis-
course， but the information present巴din the subordinate c1ause will be 
prop巴lledin the discourse following the underlined part. 
Now， what kind of information is conveyed by the conversion of th巴
informational structure of the main and subordinate c1auses? As we 
saw in Section 3， as the basis of the judgment is getting evident， the 
judgment comes c10se to a fact， rather than the speaker's judgment. 
This proc巴ssof making the judgment into the fact-like information hap-
pens in the above excerpt. The writer does not intend to present the 
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message (“1 must hav巴beentired") as his judgm巴nt，but as an objective 
description of his own condition. By deviating the basis of his judg 
ment from the norm， the writer wants to tel the interlocutor that he 
does not convey his judgment but the description of his own condition. 
In other words， what th巴speakerintends to do in the conversion of the 
foreground and background is to show the interlocutor the special way 
of presenting th巴 information. If a series of facts is pl・esentedsuffi-
ciently， the judgment comes to turn into the fact-like information. What 
should be noticed here is that the deviation from the norm serves as th巴
way the speaker conveys the message in a specific manner. 
5.2. Deviation of the ifこclauseon the judgment level 
Another typ巴ofdeviation can be found in th巴cas巴inwhich facts for 
a judgment pres巴ntedin the subordinate c1ause cannot be verified in an 
appropriate way. It is natural that a judgment is made on the basis of 
the facts. In the following example we discussed in Section 3， the 
speaker assumes that the condition will be fulfilled. In othel・words，
the ifc1ause does not express real condition， but rather the reason why 
the speaker has reached a certain conc1usion， i. e.“you should study al 
night'¥ 
(17) You should study al night， ifyou have巴xamstomorrow. 
The speaker reaches the conc1usion that the int巴rlocutorshould study 
al night on the basis of the fact that the interlocutor has exams the 
next day. 
Now， deviation can occur when the basis of th巴judgmentis not fac-
tual information， but rather information which cannot be verified. Con-
sider the following sentence. 
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(18) If I rememb巴1・correctly，there is a whiskey bottle behind the 
books. 
In an ordinary judgment sentence， the subordinate clause serves as the 
basis of the speaker's judgment， which is a fact that can be ver汀ied.
However， insentence (18)， the basis of the speaker's judgment is not a 
fact; it is the speaker's proclamation about his or her own memory. 
The only way to prove that the speaker remembers it correctly is to 
check if there is a whiskey bottle behind the books. Therefore， as 
Pelyvas (1996: 76) states， the following sentence is logically possible. 
(19) If there is a whiskey bottle behind the books， I remember it cor-
rectly. 
In this sens巴， sentence (18) is deviant in that the judgm巴ntis not based 
on facts， but on a statement that cannot be verified. It is impossible to 
verify the inner mental state of the speak巴1¥Bypositing theがclaus巴
in the statement which cannot be verified， the speaker wants to tel the 
interlocutor that the statement in the main clause， the speaker's judg 
ment， isopen to doubt. Thus， sentence (18) is equivalent in meaning to 
the following sentence (Pelyvas 1996: 69): 
(20) There may be a whiskey bottl巴b巴hindthe books. 
The speak巴1・ofsentence (18) modifies his or her own statement in a cer-
tain manner. In this case， the speaker is not sure about the existence 
of a whiskey bottle b巴hindthe books目 Bypresenting the basis of his or 
her judgment in a way that cannot be verified， the speaker can suspend 
his or her definite judgment about the existence of the bottle. The 
speaker leaves his or her judgment open to doubt， and this is what the 
(37) 260 
speake1' wants to convey to the interlocuto1'. 
6. Deviation from the norm and the levels of grammar 
We have analyzed examples on the content and judgment levels， and 
deviations f1'om no1'mal types of utte1'ance. Now let us speculate how 
we should deal with this kind of phenomenon in g1'amma1'. The fi1'st 
thing which should be taken into conside1'ation is that these deviant 
fo1'ms a1'e used in a context in which both the speake1' and interlocuto1' 
a1'e involved， and the speake1' wants to convey a message with some spe-
cial stylistic effect to the inte1'locuto1'. One clu巴tothis p1'oblem is to 
focus on th巴 similaritybetween this phenomenon and “style disjuncts" 
(Quirk et al. 1985). Semantica11y， style disjuncts exp1'ess an evaluation 
of what is being said eithe1' with 1'espect to the form of th巴commumca-
tion 01' to its meaning. 
In o1'dina1'Y communication， itis common to find some ove1't indica-
tion of autho1'ity accompanying the statement such as franluy and techni-
caly. These style disjuncts can b巴 pa1'aphrasedinto the “I te1 you" 
construction (cf. Qui1'k et al. 1985: 614). 
(21) a. F1'ankly， M1'. Fo1'ster neglects his child1'en. 
b. I t巴1you frankly that M1'. Fo1'ste1' neglects his child1'en. 
(22) a. Technica11y， we'1'e a1 t1'ave11ing in time just by existing. 
b. I te1 you technica11y that we're a1 tr・ave11ingin time just by 
existing. 
Fo1' instance， ifyou a1'e going to say something that the inte1'locuto1' 
might not like， you use the style disjunct frankかtoshow that you are 
being honest about saying something. By using the style disjunct frankー
かtolet the interlocuto1' know in advance that what you are going to say 
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is not pleasant， you can 1'educe the amount of conflict that might occu1' 
betwe巴nthe speake1' and the interlocutor. In this sense， style disjuncts 
should be dealt with on the level of 1'eal communication where both the 
speaker and inte1'locuto1' a1'巴 involved. They usually accompany a 
change in attitude to the interlocuto1'. Style disjuncts make this change 
by having the speake1' comment on the act of sp巴aking:“1am speaking 
f1'ankly， so please don't take it wrong." Style disjuncts modify the v巴rb
of communication which does not appear in the sentence because the 
communication verb is abbreviated in the surfac巴asin (21a) and (22a). 
They convey a comment by the speake1' on the style and fo1'm of what 
he or sh巴 issaying， defining in some way unde1' what conditions he 01' 
she is speaking as the autho1'ity for the utte1'ance. In this sense， style 
disjuncts se1've to facilitate the communication between the speake1' and 
interlocutor. 
Let us 1・e-examinethe deviation from th巴normwe discussed in the 
previous sections in relation to style disjuncts. 
(23) If 1 remembe1' correctly， th巴1・eis a whiskey bottle behind the 
books. 
As we discussed， on the judgment level the ifc1ause can be used as evi-
dence of why the speaker reaches the conc1usion. The ifc1ause in a 
no1'mal judgment sentence desc1'ibes information which can be verified 
objectively. This is because the speake1' makes a judgment on the basis 
of some specific facts. Howeve1'， in (23)， th巴 basisof the judgment is 
the speaker's memory which cannot be verified in an objective way; the 
only way to verify the correctness of the speake1"s memo1'y is to check 
if the content of the main clause is correct. However， of cou1'se， itis a 
circulation of verification. In this sense， sentence (23) is deviant f1'om 
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the no1'm as a judgment sentence. By placing a p1'oposition which can-
not be vel汀iedin the ifclause， the speake1' wishes to tel the inte1'locu-
to1' that the content of the main clause may be t1'u巴 butcannot be 
afi1'med. Th巴 deviationf1'om the no1'm se1'ves as a style disjunct. 
What the speake1' intends to say is something like: 
(24) I convey this message to you， but I am not su1'e about it. I use 
“If I 1'emembe1' correctly" as the basis of my judgment that the1'e 
is a whiskey bottle behind the books. Howeve1'， it is impossible 
to ve1'ify my memo1'y without p1'oving the fact given in the main 
clause. The1'efo1'e， I will p1'esent you the info1'mation of the main 
clause in a way open to doubt. 
The simila1'ity between“if I 1'ememb巴1・correctly"and style disjuncts is 
clea1'. The speake1' says to the inte1'locuto1' that the existence of a 
whiskey bottle behind the books is not definite info1'mation that hε01' 
she is sure about. This comes f1'om the fact that the only way to ve1'ify 
the memory of the speak巴1・isto check the content of the main clause. 
The1'efo1'e， the overall meaning of sentenc巴(23)is that the speaker is not 
sure about the existence of the whiskey bottle. What is at issue is that 
the speake1' utte1's this message with 1'elation to the interlocutor. By 
making the ifclause open to doubt， the d巴viantutterance f1'om the no1'm 
1'ep1'esents the speake1"s attitude towards the message presented towa1'd 
the interlocuto1': in this case， the speake1"s attitude to leave the message 
open to doubt. 
I have examined two types of utte1'ance: utt巴1'anceon the content and 
judgment levels. As fa1' as th巴sentenceson the content level are con-
cerned， the 1'ole of th巴 speake1'is simply to utter a sentence. In this 
sense， the utte1'ance is conside1'ed objective and the role of the speaker 
is not so crucial because the speake1' is not involved in the inte1'preta 
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tion of the utterance. A judgm巴ntsentence involves the speaker as we 
discussed in the pr巴vioussections. It is th巴speakerwho makes a judg-
ment that is presented in the utterance. As we saw， the judgment sent 
巴nceMr. Forster neglects his children should be read as meaning“From 
things 1 have heard and seen， 1 c1aim it to be a fair and true assessment 
that Mr. Forster neglects his children." It is the speaker (“1") who 
c1aims it to be a fair and true assessment that Mr. Forstel・neglectshis 
children. The third level is where both the speaker and interlocutor 
are involved， in which style disjuncts and deviation from the norm are 
dealt with. As we saw in the previous sections， by d巴scribinga situa-
tion with deviation from the norm， the speaker conveys th巴 messageto 
the interlocutor with a special stylistic effect. For example， the 
speaker employs the narrative-when-c1ause because the speaker is will-
ing to share the feeling of unexpectedness with the interlocutor and 
draw the interlocutor's attention to what is said in the when-c1ause. 
And the surprise and unexpectedness of the speaker associat巴dwith 
this construction is what the speaker wants to convey to the interlocu-
tor. 
7. Conclusion 
In this essay， 1 have examin巳dtwo types of uttel・anceand deviations 
from normal types of utterance. We have pointed out that the deviant 
forms of utterance should be dealt with on the level wh巴reboth the 
speaker and interlocutor are involved， because the speaker intends to 
convey a special stylistic and communicative effect. We have also sug-
gested that the phenomena of deviation should be dealt with in relation 
to“style disjuncts" as in Quirk et al. (1985). This implies that the level 
of utterance we have considered is related to a style of language. What 
we have seen is that deviation from the norm creates a certain stylistic 
(41) 256 
change in the discourse. Leech (1966: 30) suggests the adjective“de 
viant" to characterize "an essential (perhaps the essential) feature of 
literary language." He considers that the styl巴 iscreated by deviation 
from the norm. What we have discussed so far is not lit巴ral・yexpress-
ion， but it has been suggested that both literary style and utterance 
with a special style are created by deviation from the norm. 
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